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Issue 2

CCURT REPORTS

Staats v. Newman, 988 P.2d 439 (Or. 1999) (upholding Water Resources
Department's cancellation of water rights because irrigation of water rights
holders' land occurred by natural subirrigation rather than artificial
irrigation, and therefore was not a beneficial use).
The Staats owned a ranch and associated water rights allowing water to
be diverted from several streams for irrigation. In 1997, Newman and
others who own neighboring property, filed affidavits with the Water
Resources Department ("Department") alleging that the Staats had not
exercised their water rights since 1982. The Staats filed a protest to the
Department's proposed cancellation of their water rights, and the
department held a hearing.
At the hearing, the Staats contended that they use their water rights to
irrigate their lands by ditches dug by the previous owner.
The
administrative law judge ("AL") held that the Staats properly irrigated
portions of their property, and therefore maintained water rights related to
those portions. However, the AU ruled that the Staats either did not
irrigate or improperly irrigated much of the remaining portion of the land.
The AU found that many of the ditches were in disrepair, and that
irrigation only occurred through subsurface seepage and capillary action
("subirrigation").
The AU concluded that by a preponderance of
evidence, and based on applicable Oregon state law which defines
"irrigation" as the "artificial application of water," the Staats forfeited
their water rights pertaining to the portions of their property subject to
subirrigation practices.
The Staats filed exceptions to the AU's ruling. They argued that the
applicable standard of proof was "clear and convincing evidence," and that
based on this standard of proof, the evidence did not support AU's finding
of a nonuse of water on the Staats' property. The AU rejected these
exceptions and ruled that under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
correct standard of proof was a showing by a preponderance of evidence.
The department adopted both of the AL's findings in its final order, and
the Staats appealed.
The Staats first contended that the department incorrectly based its final
order on the proof of nonuse of water based on a preponderance of
evidence, rather than a showing of nonuse of water by clear and convincing
evidence. The supreme court held that in the absence of an expressly
contrary legislative directive, the preponderance of evidence standard of
proof applied under state law to water rights cancellation proceedings.
The Staats next contended that the department erred in ruling that
subirrigation did not constitute proper use of their water rights, thereby
resulting in a forfeiture of these water rights. The Staats claimed that
"use" of their water right was accomplished by virtually any diversion,
regardless of the particular method of diversion.
The department
responded that under state law, subirrigation does not constitute a "use."
The supreme court concurred with the department and held that under
Oregon law, failure to "use" water rights results in cancellation of those
rights, and the use must be what was permitted by the water right itself. In
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this case, the Staats' water rights allowed for diversion of water for
irrigation.
The court also noted that under the department's administrative rules,
"irrigation" was defined as the artificial application of water to promote
growth of crops, and that the department interpreted the rule to mean that
only the artificial application of water constituted "irrigation."
Furthermore, according to the court, the department's interpretation of the
administrative rule deserved highly deferential judicial review, as long as
the interpretation was plausible. The court finally concluded that the
department's findings that the Staats' artificial ditches were incapable of
irrigation use, and therefore irrigation had occurred through naturally
occurring subsurface seepage on their land, were both reasonable.
Steven Marlin
Dority v. Hiller, 986 P.2d 636 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that: (1) an
irrevocable license existed for a pipeline through plaintiffs property; (2)
defendants did not abandon such license when they changed the location of
the pipeline; (3) plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the license;
and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting an injunction
requiring plaintiffs to remove riser and restore defendant's pipeline
connection).
Milton Wolsborn originally owned Dority's property, which was
situated on a diversion point on the Willamette River. In 1964, the Hillers
applied for and were granted a permit to take water from a point on
Wolsborn's property. The Hillers buried a steel pipeline from the river,
across the Dority's field, and into their property. The Hillers also installed
an electrical pole and box in order to operate the pump. They used this
pipeline to irrigate their fields.
In 1967, the Doritys purchased Wolsborn's property. The Doritys
applied for a permit to take water from the same diversion point where
Hillers obtained their water. In 1975, the Hiller's sought to replace the
steel pipeline with a plastic one. When Dority asked if they had an
easement, the Hillers replied that they had a written easement from
Wolsborn. Dority then gave them permission to install the plastic pipeline.
In 1994, quarrels began between the two parties. Dority installed a
rise and disconnected Hiller's pipeline at least once. Dority then filed suit
against the Hillers to quiet title to real property and for damages on
theories of trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance.
The Hillers's counterclaims sought a declaration of a right to maintain
an irrigation pipeline across Dority's property. The Hillers moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that they possessed an irrevocable
license to use Dority's property for the pipeline. The trial court granted
the motion and enjoined the Doritys from interfering with the pipe
connection. The Doritys appealed.
Before reaching the merits, the Oregon Court of Appeal decided

